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Key messages
 ► The COVID-19 pandemic has triggered unprece-
dented measures worldwide, which have often been 
adopted in an ‘emergency’ mode and are largely 
reactionary
 ► Alternatively, COVID-19 needs to be appraised as 
part of a much bigger health picture, adopting a 
“systems approach” that enables interactions with 
other acknowledged and preventable health con-
ditions, which often receive disproportionately low 
attention
 ► To do so requires a paradigm shift in global health 
governance, from a specific reactional paradigm to a 
systemic, coordinated and preventive paradigm
 ► It is necessary to adopt a holistic approach to health 
reflecting both a security approach and a health de-
velopment approach, tackling upstream causes and 
determinants, aimed at helping populations reduce 
their individual risk factors and augment their nat-
ural immunity
 ► Such preventive health policies must be tailored to 
local specificities and local environments, and health 
systems must be strengthened at the local level so 
as to be able to respond to population needs and 
expectations
 ► The current crisis calls for a paradigm shift in public 
and global health policies; and in the in the nexus 
between local, national and global health policies 
and systems
InTroduCTIon
The WHO declared the novel coronavirus 
disease 2019 (COVID-19) an ‘emergency of 
international concern’ on 30 January 2020 
and a pandemic on 11 March. According to 
WHO’s Situation Report - 79, as of 8 April 
2020, the epidemic has caused 79 235 deaths 
worldwide.1 While it is seemingly nearing 
its end in China, where it was first reported, 
it is still on the rise in Europe, in the USA 
and in other parts of the world, including in 
many low- income and middle- income coun-
tries (LMICs). The pandemic has triggered 
unprecedented measures worldwide. Many 
countries have installed travel bans, confine-
ment and lockdown policies. These responses 
have been adopted in an ‘emergency’ mode, 
and are largely reactionary, aimed at miti-
gating the spread of the disease while waiting 
for a specific cure and/or vaccine to be devel-
oped.
Here we do not want to underestimate the 
risks caused by the pandemic, nor to question 
the measures taken by the WHO and govern-
ments. But we would like to express our 
concerns regarding four COVID-19- related 
issues, and advocate for a ‘paradigm shift’—
that is, a scientific revolution encompassing 
changes in the basic concepts and experi-
mental practices of a scientific discipline2—to 
prepare for future crises.
A shIfT In foCus: CoVId-19 In The broAder 
globAl heAlTh pICTure
It is important to remember other acknowl-
edged and preventable health conditions, 
when compared with the focus that COVID-19 
has triggered at global and national levels. 
Respiratory diseases have been leading 
causes of death and disability in the world 
before COVID-19. It is estimated that, glob-
ally, four million people die prematurely 
from chronic respiratory disease each year; 
in particular, one million die annually from 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease; 
pneumonia kills millions of people annually 
and is a leading cause of death among chil-
dren under 5 years old; each year 1.4 million 
die from tuberculosis; and lung cancer kills 
1.6 million people a year and is the deadliest 
cancer.3 The WHO estimates that seasonal 
influenza kills up to 650 000 people a year.4 
In 2018, an estimated 405 000 people died 
of malaria.5 In 2017, about 295 000 women 
died during and following pregnancy and 
childbirth—that is approximately 810 women 
each day.6 In the USA alone, a lower limit of 
 on A









ealth: first published as 10.1136/bm





2 Paul E, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002622. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002622
BMJ Global Health
210 000 deaths per year was associated with preventable 
harm in hospitals.7
Whereas infectious diseases seem to inspire the 
most terror among the public and policymakers, non- 
communicable diseases are responsible for almost 70% 
of all deaths.8 Depression affects 300 million people glob-
ally and is the leading cause of disability worldwide, and 
nearly 800 000 people die from suicide every year.9 The 
global boom in premature mortality and morbidity from 
non- communicable diseases has now reached a point 
where some have even suggested it to be a pandemic.10 
Moreover, climate change (through increased heat waves 
and disasters) and atmospheric and environmental pollu-
tion are expected to increase deaths and injuries, espe-
cially in LMICs.11 In some debates, climate change has 
become more than a risk factor, with increasing calls for 
the WHO to declare it a public health emergency.12
From a public health perspective, COVID-19 needs to 
be appraised as part of a much bigger health picture. For 
instance, beyond the lethality and direct mortality rates 
of COVID-19, attention should be paid to the interac-
tion with other pathogens, as well as to the more indirect 
effects of its mitigation measures.13 Indeed, the pandemic 
and its containment measures interact with, and impact 
on, other health conditions and will have system- wide 
effects, highlighting the importance of adopting a 
‘systems approach’ to its resolution.14
A pArAdIgm shIfT In globAl heAlTh goVernAnCe
The global health community, national security agencies 
and all governments have known that a pandemic like 
COVID-19 was likely to come, yet global health policy has 
remained woefully unprepared nor fit- for- purpose. In 
2015, the G7 members proclaimed that Ebola had been 
a ‘wake- up call’ for the need for better global coopera-
tion. It was also recognised that antimicrobial resistance 
(AMR) threatened to kill 300 million people by 2050, 
thus demanding urgent action. Yet little has been done 
to address these existing global health governance short-
comings.15
For example, the lauded G7 and G20 response, the 
Global Health Security Agenda (https:// ghsagenda. 
org/), continues to speak in the terms of costly ‘counter- 
measures’ versus prevention and health system strength-
ening. Moreover, the Pandemic Emergency Financing 
Facility (PEF) (https://www. worldbank. org/ en/ topic/ 
pandemics/ brief/ pandemic- emergency- financing- 
facility), meant to deliver up to $500 million in epidemic 
assistance to curb expansion into a pandemic, sits idle 
as a complicated ‘loan mechanism’ at the World Bank, 
available to only a few countries (eg, China and India do 
not qualify for the money). There is also serious ambi-
guity about how the PEF intersects and/or complements 
the WHO’s Contingency Fund for Emergencies (CFE) 
(https://www. who. int/ emergencies/ funding/ contin-
gency- fund- for- emergencies). The CFE is available to 
more countries for more risks, and more quickly, but 
represents far less money than the PEF (which, in theory, 
should come after the CFE, if you happen to prequalify 
for the loan).16 The ‘One Health’ approach, which was 
meant to offer a more responsive research and policy 
agenda to combat zoonotic diseases, remains sluggish at 
best and underdeveloped in terms of including environ-
mental factors, such as soil and water, which play a crucial 
part in AMR and other threats.17
In terms of pathogen monitoring and response, the 
2005 International Health Regulations, which are meant 
‘to help the international community and governments 
prevent and respond to acute public health risks that 
have the potential to cross borders and threaten people 
worldwide’,18 are not fully implemented by many coun-
tries due to limited financial resources and political will, 
and have been violated in response to the COVID-19 
outbreak.19 What is more confounding is that many high- 
income countries like France have failed to fully imple-
ment the International Health Regulations, particularly 
in their overseas territories.16 In addition, other disease 
control mechanisms, like the WHO Global Influenza 
Surveillance and Response System (https://www. who. 
int/ influenza/ gisrs_ laboratory/ en/), remain inade-
quate and underfunded, with too few WHO laboratories 
and a market- based model where a global public good 
(pooled influenza knowledge) is turned into a private 
good (pharmaceutical profit), with historical inequities 
in terms of public health.20 Moreover, many countries, 
like China, are incentivised not to raise the epidemic 
alarm too soon due to fears of diminished direct foreign 
investment (like with severe acute respiratory syndrome, 
H7N9 and now COVID-19) and fears that the govern-
ment will be perceived as weak.21
These conditions of incapacity at the international level 
are exacerbated by a weakened WHO, whose budget has 
been radically reduced and ring- fenced. For example, the 
WHO used to receive three- quarters of its financing from 
assessed contributions levied on members. However, a 
change to a zero real growth policy for its regular budget 
in the 1980s has meant it now only receives a quarter 
of its budget from member contributions. As a result, 
the WHO is dependent on extra- budgetary ring- fenced 
‘pet project’ funding from donors to fill an increasingly 
shrinking budget.22 As the money flows to other multi-
lateral health initiatives, the WHO’s authority dissipates, 
with numerous organisations like the Institute for Health 
Metrics and Evaluation, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foun-
dation and Médecins Sans Frontières able to command 
greater epistemic authority,23 financial influence24 and 
response effectiveness.25 However, this expansion of 
initiatives creates a condition of policy fragmentation, 
which significantly weakens coordinated global public 
health.26 27
One real result of fragmentation of global health 
governance is an inefficient division of labour, where 
hundreds of actors such as the WHO, Global Fund, Pres-
ident’s Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief, United Nations 
Programme on HIV and AIDS, United States Agency 
 on A









ealth: first published as 10.1136/bm





Paul E, et al. BMJ Global Health 2020;5:e002622. doi:10.1136/bmjgh-2020-002622 3
BMJ Global Health
for International Development, World Bank, the Gates 
Foundation and the Clinton Foundation (to name only a 
few) produce parallel programmes or bric-à-brac vertical 
health silos that have neither generated overall system 
strengthening in high burden countries nor allowed for 
effective global health policy.27 28 This creates two fail-
ures. First, contrary to sector- wide approaches,29 vertical 
‘pet- project’ global initiatives often fail to promote 
sustainable long- term local health system strengthening, 
which is the best preventive defence for disease control 
(of all types, not just infectious diseases). Second, the 
global level is woefully unprepared for epidemics, since 
global policy has remained reactionary, symptom- based 
and dependent on vaccine discoveries without full appre-
ciation of other upstream determinants of disease and 
access to those vaccines.
Given the state of global health governance and inad-
equate investments in health system strengthening—as 
well as the failure, by many actors, to adopt a ‘systems 
approach’ to problem resolution14—the spread and 
danger of COVID-19 is not surprising. What is required, 
we argue, is to shift global health policymaking from a 
specific reactional paradigm to a systemic, holistic and 
preventive paradigm. There is no doubt that this approach 
will require serious resources, governance reform and 
political will. Nevertheless, the global economic costs of 
COVID-19 have already reached into at least a trillion 
dollars.30 Thus, serious efforts to improve global and local 
health systems would be a small fraction of this cost, with 
a tried and true cost- saving philosophy that ‘an ounce of 
prevention is worth a pound of cure’.
beyond The ‘pAsTeurIAn pArAdIgm’: A holIsTIC VIew of 
heAlTh
The emergency responses to COVID-19 so far are based 
on the so- called ‘Pasteurian paradigm’, which states 
that each disease is due to one pathogen; thus, for each 
disease there is one cure, targeting the responsible path-
ogen. In this case, laboratories are racing to find the cure 
or the vaccine against COVID-19—a vaccine which will 
come too late for the current epidemic, and will have 
limited efficacy if the virus mutates in the coming months 
or years. Yet it is easy to see how the more pathogens 
there might be in the future (which there will be) the 
less this paradigm makes sense. Moreover, the Pasteurian 
paradigm has imposed its preferred research method—
namely, randomised control trials that try to isolate one 
variable from all possible variables—as the gold standard 
of science, relegating other approaches as near charla-
tanism.
However, there is a multitude of evidence indicating that 
beyond a single pathogen, the development of a disease, 
as well as its outcome, is considerably affected by the 
physical and social parameters in which it operates, and 
that this is considerably affected by social, political, envi-
ronmental and individual factors.31 32 This seems widely 
known by the public as far as chronic non- communicable 
diseases are concerned, but is also the case for infectious 
diseases, especially for emerging infections, in which the 
pathogenic role of social inequalities is recognised.33 
Moreover, the traditional frontiers between communi-
cable and non- communicable diseases are being blurred 
by evidence of ‘biosocial contagion’.34 In this light, the 
globalised world is now facing a ‘syndemic’—that is, a 
synergy of epidemics that ‘co occur in time and place, 
interact with each other to produce complex sequelae, 
and share common underlying societal drivers’.35 
COVID-19 is no exception, since its mortality rate varies 
significantly according to age, sex and comorbidities.36
As an alternative, we argue that it would be more 
effective, efficient and equitable to adopt a holistic 
approach to health. How to tackle the silent killers and 
how to prepare populations—including the most vulner-
able37—against future epidemics should be on the top of 
national and global health policy and research agendas. 
This should reflect both a security approach (fighting 
symptomatic issues) and a health development approach 
(tackling upstream causes and determinants). In doing 
so, the objectives should not be merely be the response 
mode, but a more concerted effort to limit environ-
mental factors, protect biodiversity,38 reduce social health 
inequities, strengthen local health systems for preventive 
health, help populations reduce their individual risk 
factors and augment their natural immunity—notably 
through various ‘healthy behaviours’ and diets that are 
proven to strengthen the general immune system.39–46 
Like what recently took place in the field of evaluation 
of complex systems and policies,47 a ‘realist’ revolution of 
medical research is probably needed to help support this.
from globAl soluTIons To loCAl AdApTATIons
It is ultimately important that the resulting policies are 
not copy- pasted from other countries, but adapted to 
each context, and backed by strong local health systems. 
By definition, preventive health policies must be tailored 
to local specificities, including local environments, and 
health systems must be strengthened at the local level 
so as to be able to respond to a population’s needs and 
expectations. This is also the case for the response to 
COVID-19. Viruses and epidemics have always existed, 
and will always exist, and should be anticipated.48 49 Coro-
naviruses are a well- known family of viruses, and even if 
this one is particularly aggressive, its genome has been 
rapidly identified. The difference with this epidemic 
which is causing the semicollapse of health systems is that 
it has revealed a profound lack of national prevention 
and preparedness. In response to the epidemic, the most 
hit countries so far have faced a lack of equipment and 
critical care beds. In the UK and France, as just two exam-
ples, decades of austerity policies and an obsession with 
evaluating health facilities based on technical efficiency 
(ie, minimising inputs and increasing outputs) have 
considerably decreased the capacity of health systems to 
respond to above- average frequentation.50
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The COVID-19 emergency responses of many states 
have revealed important inconsistencies. In many Euro-
pean countries, the authorities have adopted a one- size- 
fits- all policy and imposed the same measures everywhere. 
More worryingly, some governments—notably in Africa—
have not performed their own adapted risk assessment 
before copy- pasting strategies from abroad.51 This is 
problematic, since it makes little sense to use a predictive 
model developed from a country where the median age 
is 47 and translate it to a country with a median age of 18, 
without adjusting the parameters. In addition, current 
policies fail to account for regional or transborder 
contextual parameters, where either more stringent or 
relaxed measures could be more suitable depending on 
geographical determinants. The universal lockdown of a 
whole country may not be necessary when there are only 
one or two epidemic outbreaks separated by hundreds of 
miles, especially if containment is quick and determined. 
What we suggest, in order to be effective, is that policies 
should fit each context and be adaptive at the territo-
rial or ecosystem level, versus being unreflectively and 
uniformly bounded by national jurisdictions. This is the 
best way to not impose measures that are too coercive, 
which may face legal constraints and may be counterpro-
ductive, eroding public trust and cooperation.52 53
In the post- COVID-19 recovery phase, we hope the 
lessons learnt from local, national and global responses 
to this pandemic will foster support, by policymakers and 
by the public, for tailored policy responses that support 
stronger and more integrated local health systems.
ConClusIon
In summary, the current crisis calls for a paradigm shift 
in public and global health policies. We will not be 
prepared for the next epidemic unless we take bold steps. 
First, global health policies should not be designed on a 
response mode to case- by- case threats, but should adopt 
a systems approach that can support a holistic picture of 
global disease burdens, risks and health conditions, as 
well as better consider the system- wide effects of adopted 
measures. Second, countering current fragmentation in 
global health governance will require a substantial shift in 
global health policymaking from a reactional paradigm 
to a systemic and preventive paradigm, with meaningful 
commitments to human health security. Third, there is a 
need to shift our focus from short- term curative policies 
based on the Pasteurian paradigm, to long- term preven-
tive and promotional policies based on a holistic view of 
people’s health, which notably implies limiting environ-
mental factors, reducing social health inequities, helping 
populations reduce their individual risk factors and 
augmenting their natural immunity. Lastly, such holistic, 
preventive policies must be adapted to local contexts and 
implemented through strong local health systems able to 
have the ‘cushion’ capacity to respond to emergencies.
Twitter Valery Ridde @ValeryRidde
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